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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District does not dispute
nor object to the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court to hear
this appeal.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Should Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities, 619 P.2d 325
(Utah 1980), be overruled?
Standard of Review:

This issue presents a question of lawf

which is reviewed for correctness.

See Saunders v. Sharp,

806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).
II.

Should the rule in Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities,
619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980), be applied to the installation of
sewer lines and other utility facilities beneath public road
rights-of-way?
Standard of Review:

This issue presents a question of law,

which is reviewed for correctness. See Saunders v. Sharp, 806
P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
I.

Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-89:
dedication.

Public use constituting

A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten
years.
II.

Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-133: Excavations, structures or
objects prohibited within right-of-way except in accordance
with regulations - Penalty for violation.
1

Except as otherwise provided in Section 54-4-15, Utah
code Annotated, 1953, no right-of-way of any state highway,
county road or city street shall be dug up or excavated and no
approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer,
ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising sign, or any other
structure or object of any kind or character shall be placed,
constructed, or maintained within any such right-of-way except
as permitted by, and in accordance with, the regulations of
the highway authorities having jurisdiction over such rightof-way.
Any person who violates the provisions of this section is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-134: Authorities may regulate,
require permit and security for excavation or construction Limitation on authority.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 54-4-15, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, the highway authorities of the state,
counties, cities and towns are authorized to adopt
regulations, and may require a permit containing reasonable
terms and conditions, for the crossing, digging-up, or the
placement, construction, and maintenance of approach roads,
driveways, structures, poles, pipelines, conduits, sewers,
ditches, culverts, facilities, or any other structures or
objects of any kind or character on the public highway rightsof-way under their respective jurisdiction.
Said highway
authorities may require a surety bond or other reasonable
security which may be forfeited in the event the regulations
or the conditions of a permit are breached.
The authority granted by this section shall not be
exercised so as to deny reasonable ingress and egress to
property adjoining a public highway except where said highway
authorities have acquired such right of ingress and egress by
gift, agreement, purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise or
where no right of ingress or egress exists between the rightof-way and the adjoining property.
Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-135: Installations constructed in
violation of rules - Rights of highway authorities to remove
or require removal.
(1)
If any person, firm, or corporation installs,
places, constructs, alters, repairs, or maintains any approach
road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch,
culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or
object of any kind or character within the right-of-way of any
highway without complying with this chapter, the highway
authorities having jurisdiction over the right-of-way may:
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way
or require the person, firm, or corporation to remove the
installation; or
2

(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or
corporation to remove the installation from the right-ofway.
(2) Notice under Subsection (1)(b) may be served by:
(a) personal service; or
(b) (i) mailing the notice to the person, firm,
or corporation by certified mail; and
(ii) posting a copy on the installation for
ten days.
(3) If the installation is not removed within ten days
after the notice is complete, the highway authorities may
remove the installation at the expense of the person, firm, or
corporation.
(4) The highway authorities may recover:
(a) the costs and expenses incurred in removing the
installation, serving notice, and the costs of a lawsuit
if any; and
(b) $10 for each day the installation remained
within the right-of-way after notice was complete.
(5) (a) If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or
denies the existence, placement, construction, or
maintenance of the installation, or refuses to remove or
permit its removal, the highway authorities may bring an
action to abate the installation as a public nuisance.
(b) If the highway authorities are granted a
judgment, the highway authorities may recover the costs
of having the public nuisance abated as provided in
Subsection (4).
(6) The department, its agents, or employees, if acting
in good faith, incur no liability for causing removal of an
installation within a right-of-way of a highway as provided in
this section.
(7) The actions of the department under this section are
not subject to the provisions of Chapter 46b, Title 63, the
Administrative Procedures Act.
V.

Utah Code Annotated § 17-5-39franchises - Granting Terms and conditions.

They may grant franchises along and over the public roads
and highways for all lawful purposes, upon such terms,
conditions and restrictions as in the judgment of the board
may be necessary and proper, to be exercised in such manner as
to present the least possible obstruction and inconvenience to
the traveling public, but such permission shall not be for a
longer period than fifty years.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District accepts the

Appellant's and Respondents' statements regarding the nature of the
case.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District accepts the

Appellant's and Respondents' statements regarding the course of
proceedings in this case.

C.

DEPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District accepts the

Appellant's and Respondents' statements regarding the disposition
at trial.

D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District accepts the

Appellant's and Respondents' statements regarding the facts of the
case.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Pickett v. California Pacific Utilities, 619 P.2d 325

(Utah 1980) should not be overruled because both statutory and case
law support the rationale that public highway rights-of-way,
regardless of how obtained, are intended to be expansive in nature.
4

Sewer lines and other utility lines fall within the purview of such
uses for public rights-of-way and do not constitute an increased
burden on the abutting property for which compensation is required.
2.

Pickett

is

representative

of

the

mainstream

of

contemporary law and its rationale should be explicitly made
applicable to the installation of sewer lines within the public
rights-of-way.

The doctrine of stare decisis weighs heavily in

favor of upholding Pickett and extending it to the present case
because of the reliance that the public has placed on its rule of
law.
ARGUMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION
A decision by this Court to overrule Pickett or to refuse

to extend

its principles to the installation of sewer lines

installed

within

a

public

right-of-way

would

have

a

very

detrimental effect on the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement
District and the approximately 75 water and sewer districts in the
State of Utah.

Snyderville is a political subdivision created

under the auspices of the laws of Utah.

It provides sewage

treatment and disposal for citizens and businesses within the
Snyderville Basin and includes areas from Summit Park and Jeremy
Ranch, to and including Park City, Utah.

Like Snyderville, which

has elected trustees, most of the sewer and water districts
throughout

the

state

are

governmental

entities

responsibilities to the citizens within their service area.
5

with
With

the exception of possibly a few service districts within the Salt
Lake City metropolitan area, the decision in this case will
directly impact the current water and sewer service being offered
throughout the geographical majority of the state and may have a
significant effect on future expansion and growth in smaller
communities and in rural Utah,
From its inception in the late 1970's, Snyderville has relied
on its ability to service outlying and newly developed subdivisions
by accessing them with lines installed beneath the public rightsof-way of roads connecting these subdivisions.

Furthermore, much

of the future growth potential within the District's boundaries
depends upon the ability of the district to utilize the rights-ofway in highways.

(See Addendum 1, Affidavit of Rex Ausburn.)

In

addition to these problems, Park City, would likely be unable to
financially cope with the expense involved in acquiring easements
for the water and sewer lines within its city limits because many
of the public streets and rights-of-way are not platted streets,
but have been obtained by public use.

(See Addendum 2, Affidavit

of Eric W. DeHaan.)
Snyderville, like the other water and sewer districts in the
state, has relied upon the rule of law enunciated in Pickett and
has made short and long range planning decisions based thereon.
Snyderville and the other governmental entities require a ruling
extending the Pickett decision to include underground sewer lines.
While there is persuasive statutory and case law supporting
the

rule

of

law

enunciated

in
6

Pickett,

there

is

also

an

overwhelming public policy argument

in this state supporting

Pickett. While many water and sewer districts throughout the state
are small and have very modest financial resources, they each
provide critically important services to the citizens of this
state.

If Pickett were overruled, not only would expansion of

services become prohibitively expensive for many of the districts
because they would be required to pay for use of easements already
vested in the public, but many would have to allocate scarce
resources to fend off lawsuits and pay for easements in which water
and sewer pipes already lie. This is a case in which the greatest
good for the greatest number in the long run favors upholding
Pickett and extending its rationale to include underground sewer
lines.

II.

STATUTORY LAW SUPPORTS THE PICKETT DECISION AND ITS EXTENSION
TO UNDERGROUND SEWER LINES.
An easement is an interest in property which, though distinct

from an ownership in the land itself, nevertheless confers upon the
holder of the easement an enforceable right to use the property of
another.

In this case, as in Pickett v. California Pacific

Utilities, 619 P.2d

325

(Utah 1980), the highway easement in

question was deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public because it was continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period of ten years. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the public, as represented by
state and local governments, has an enforceable right to use the
7

property in question.

The issue in this case is the nature and

extent of the public's use.

In deciding this issue, the Court

should first look to the statutory scheme under which the easement
was created.
The easement at issue in this action was created by the
express terms of Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89.

However, the Court's

review of the issue should not end with of review of this section.
Rather, this section should be construed in harmony with other
statutes relevant to the subject matter.

Grayson Roper Ltd.

Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Utah 1989); Stahl
v. Utah Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980).
Section 27-12-89 is located in Title 27 of the Utah Code
entitled

"Highways."

This Title also includes several other

provisions which indicate that the legislature intended that the
installation of transmission poles, sewer lines and the like are
within the scope of the public highway right-of-way created by
Section 27-12-89.

For example, Utah Code Ann § 27-12-133 states:

. . . no right-of-way of any state highway, county road
or city street shall be dug up or excavated and no
approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer,
ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising sign or any other
structure or object of any kind or character shall be
placed, constructed, or maintained within any such rightof-way except as permitted by, and in accordance with,
the regulations of the highway authorities having
jurisdiction over such right-of-way. [Emphasis added]
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-134 states:
. . . the highway authorities of the state, counties,
cities and towns are authorized to adopt regulations, and
may require a permit containing reasonable terms and
conditions, for crossing, digging up, or the placement,
construction, and maintenance of approach roads,
driveways, structures, poles, pipelines, conduits,
8

sewers, ditches, culverts, facilities, or any other
structures or objects of any kind or character on the
public highway rights-of-way under their respective
jurisdiction . • . . [Emphasis added]
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-135(1) provides:
[i]f any person, firm, or corporation installs,
places, constructs, alters, repairs, or maintains any
approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer
ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other
structure or object of any kind or character within the
right-of-wav of any highway without complying with this
chapter, the highway authorities having jurisdiction over
the right-of-way may . • . . (Emphasis added]
In addition to the above statutes found in Title 27, Utah Code
Ann. § 17-5-39 vests counties, such as Daggett County, with the
power to
grant franchises along and over public roads and highways
for lawful purposes, upon such terms, conditions and
restrictions as in the judgment of the board may be
necessary and proper . . . .
These statutes, as well as others within Title 27, make it
clear that sewer lines and other utility lines are structures that
are expected to be built and are intended to be part of and
included within the right-of-way for a public highway.

If this

were not so, the legislature would not have provided counties with
the power to grant franchises over highways and to regulate the
conditions under which sewers and the like may be installed,
repaired or removed.

The legislature intended that sewers and

other public utility structures be within the scope of a public
highway right-of-way regardless of whether the right-of-way was
acquired by use or formal dedication. Any other interpretation is
at odds with legislative intent in this regard.

9

This Court previously adopted a similar position when it
declared that
. . . public welfare demands that the people be served
with water, sewer systems, electricity, gas, telephone
and telegraph, as well as transportation and means of
travel. These services are vital to the well-being of
our various communities. It would be almost impossible
to meet these urgent requirements without making use of
the public property.
The presence of the utility
facilities on the streets constitutes a use in the public
interest subject to public regulation, and an object
within the purview of a public policy to be established
by the legislature.
Pickett, 619 P. 2d at 327 (quoting State Road Commission v. Utah
Power & Light Co., 353 P.2d 171 (Utah I960)).

As demonstrated in

this Brief, the Town of Manila's Brief as well as in other Amicus
Briefs, the legislative intent is as clear today as it was when
Pickett was decided.

Appellants have failed to provide the Court

with a persuasive basis for overruling Pickett.

Thus, the Court

should uphold Pickett and affirm the trial court's decision and
extend the Pickett rationale to include sewer and other utility
structures within the scope of the public highway right-of-way
created by Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89.

III.

CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE PICKETT DECISION AND IT EXTENSION TO
UNDERGROUND SEWER LINES.
While in the past there has been a diversity of opinion among

the various jurisdictions as to whether utility lines constitute a
public use within the scope of a public easement, this amicus has
found no diversity of opinion in recent years in cases adjudicating
underground sewer lines.

Furthermore, the Broadbent Brief failed
10

to cite a single case supporting its position that deals with sewer
lines. Since the instant case concerns the question of whether the
installation of underground sewer lines in a right-of-way obtained
by public use constitutes an increased burden on the abutting
property, several of the numerous cases which support Manilafs and
the Amici Curiae position will be reviewed below. The holdings in
each of these cases support the rationale in Pickett and support
the extension of Pickett to include underground sewer lines.
In Bentel v. Bannock, 104 Idaho 130, 656 P.2d 1383 (1983), a
case dealing with a County Board of Commissioner's grant of a
city's application to place sewer lines under a county road rightof-way obtained by prescriptive use, the court determined that an
easement in a county road includes "the right to install subsurface pipelines for waste water transmission." 656 P.2d at 1387.
The court also found that the installation of sewage pipelines in
a roadway easement did not increase the burden on a servient
estate,

because

the

scope

of

a

public

road

easement

was

comprehensive enough to include "reasonably foreseeable public uses
of such roadways, such as sub-surface installations for sewage,
run-off,

communications

and

other

services

necessary

to the

increased quality of life which generally accompanies the growth of
civilization."

656 P.2d at 1386.

In Evde Brothers Development Co. , v. Eaton County Drain
Commissioner, 398 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. 1986), an owner of property
abutting a highway dedicated by public use contended that the
highway easement extended only to surface transportation and that
11

efforts to construct a sewer beneath the highway was an illegal
trespass and taking.

That court held that "the scope of an

easement within a highway established by user includes the right to
build sewers without the consent of or compensation to the fee
owner..-11

398 N.W.2d at 302.

In Bolinaer v. City of Bozeman, 493 P. 2d 1062 (Mont. 1972), a
case with facts strikingly similar to the instant case, the Montana
court held that the public easement in a county highway is not
solely restricted to use of the roadway for movement of vehicular
traffic, but under

such easement, a municipal

sewer may be

installed without the consent of or compensation to adjoining
landowners.

In support of this holding, the court quoted the

following language from a Minnesota1 case:
If there is any one fact established in the history of
society and of the law itself, it is that the mode of
exercising this easement is expansive, developing and
growing as civilization advances.
* * * Hence it has become settled law that the easement
is not limited to the particular methods of use in vogue
when the easement was acquired, but includes all new and
improved methods, the utility and general convenience of
which may afterwards be discovered and developed in aid
of the general purpose for which highways are designed.
* * * Another proposition, which we believe to be sound,
is that the public easement in a highway is not limited
to travel or transportation of persons or property in
moveable vehicles. * * * But it is now universally
conceded that urban highways may be used for constructing
sewers and laying pipes for the transmission of gas,
water, and the like for public use. * * * The uses
referred to of urban streets are not in aid of travel,
but are themselves independent and primary uses, although
1

Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 N.W.
Ill (construction of a telephone line along a rural highway found
to be within the public easement on plaintiff's property).
12

all within the general purpose for which highways are
designed. Neither can a distinction between urban and
rural ways be sustained on the ground that such uses were
contemplated when the public easement was acquired in the
former but not when the easement was acquired in the
latter.
* * * In our judgment, public highways, whether urban or
rural, are designed as avenues of communication; and, if
the original conception of a highway was limited to
travel and transportation of property in moveable
vehicles, it was because these were the only modes of
communication then known; that as a civilization
advanced, and new and improved methods of communication
and transportation were developed, these are all in aid
of and within the general purpose for which highways are
designed. Whether it be travel, the transportation of
persons
and
property,
or
the
transmission
of
intelligence, and whether accomplished by old methods or
by new ones, they are all included within the public
'highway easement,' and impose no additional servitude on
the land...
493 P.2d at 1065-1066 (quoting Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch.
Co.. 60 Minn. 539, 63 N.W. Ill, 112).
These are but a few of the cases dealing with the precise
issue before this Court in the case at bar. Each of them adhere to
the reasoning set forth in Pickett that "uses of a public highway
are expansive and are not confined to uses either permitted .or
contemplated at the time of dedication but are extended to new
uses, consistent and proper as civilization advances."

Pickett,

619 P. 2d at 327. Based upon such reasoning, Pickett should not be
overruled but should be upheld and explicitly extended to include
underground sewer lines.

IV.

PICKETT SHOULD BE UPHELD BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OP STARE
DECISIS.
Not only should Pickett be upheld and extended to include the
13

installation of underground sewer lines and other utilities based
upon both statutory and case law, but the doctrine of stare decisis
also ways heavily in favor of upholding Pickett,

As stated in

Justice Hall's dissenting opinion in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d
417 (Utah 1990):
Today's decision needs be controlled [b]y the important
doctrine of stare decisis, the means by which we ensure
that the law will not merely change erratically, but will
develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That
doctrine permits society to presume that bed-rock
principles are founded in the law rather than in the
proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to
the integrity of our constitutional system of government,
both in appearance and in fact. While stare decisis is
not an inexorable command, the careful observer will
discern that any detours from the straight path of stare
decisis in our past have occurred for articulable
reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged "to
bring its opinions into agreement with experience and
with facts newly ascertained."
Our history does not impose any rigid formula to
constrain the Court in the disposition of cases. Rather,
its lesson is that every successful proponent of
overruling precedent has borne the heavy burden of
persuading the Court that changes in society or in the
law dictate that the values served by stare decisis yield
in favor of a greater objective. In [this case] we have
been offered no reason to believe that any such
metamorphosis has rendered the Court's long commitment to
a rule of reversal outdated, ill-founded, unworkable, or
otherwise
legitimately
vulnerable
to
serious
reconsideration. On the contrary, the need for such a
rule is as compelling today as it was at its inception.
Staker, 785 P.2d at 424-25, (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986)).
The brief of Broadbent Land Company has not "borne the heavy
burden of persuading the Court that changes in society or in the
law dictate that the values served by stare decisis must yield in
favor of a greater objective."

Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266.
14

To the

contrary, Broadbent's brief relies on case law that represents a
minority position among the various jurisdictions and which has not
been relied upon by other courts in recent years.

Furthermore,

Broadbent has failed to cite supporting cases which deal with the
specific factual and legal questions before the Court and has
failed to articulate any persuasive public policy rationale for
overruling Pickett.
A statement by United States Supreme Court Justice Stevens in
a concurring opinion is instructive in this regard:
Of even greater importance, however, is my concern about
the potential damage to the legal system that may be
caused by frequent or sudden reversals of direction that
may appear to have been occasioned by nothing more
significant than a change in the identity of this Court's
personnel. Granting that a zigzag is sometimes the best
course, I am firmly convinced that we have a profound
obligation to give recently decided cases the strongest
presumption of validity. That presumption is supported
by much more than the desire to foster an appearance of
certainty and impartiality in the administration of
justice, or the interest in facilitating the labor of
judges. The presumption is an essential thread in the
mantel of protection that the law affords the individual.
Citizens must have confidence that the rules on which
they rely in ordering their affairs — particularly when
they are prepared to take issue with those in power in
doing so — are rules of law and not merely the opinions
of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high
office.
For me, the adverse consequences of adhering to an
arguably erroneous precedent in the case are far less
serious than the consequences of further unraveling the
doctrine of stare decisis.
Staker, 785 P.2d at 425, (quoting Florida Dept. of Health and
Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n. 450 U.S. 147, 152-55
(1981)(Stevens, J., concurring)).
From

its

inception, Snyderville

Basin

Sewer

Improvement

District, as well as the other amici, have relied upon common law
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doctrines relating to the use of public easements for sewer line
purposes.

Such reliance was bolstered in 1980 when this Court

ruled in Pickett that utility poles are permissive uses within a
public highway easement.
In the words of Justice Hall's dissent in Staker, Broadbent
has "not offered any new facts, claims, or special justifications,
in view of other decisions by the Court in this context, meriting
'serious reconsideration' or rendering the 'Court's long commitment
to a rule of reversal

outdated, ill-founded, unworkable, or

otherwise legitimately vulnerable to serious reconsideration.'"
Staker, 785 P.2d at 426, (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266).
In view of these facts and the policy behind the doctrine of
stare decisis, the Court should uphold its decision in Pickett and
allow it to remain "until changed by the legislature, whose
prerogative it is to make and to change the law."

State v.

Kelback, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing Argument, Pickett
should not be overruled because its reasoning is consistent with
statutory and case law and provides the greatest benefit for the
greatest number of people in this state without infringing upon the
rights of

individuals or their property.

In addition, the

rationale in Pickett should be extended to permit sewer pipes to be
installed within the public road rights-of-way without the consent
of or compensation to the abutting property owner.
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Snyderville

respectfully requests this Court to uphold the Pickett decision and
affirm the lower Court's ruling applying Pickett to the facts of
this case.
DATED this /Y "^5ay of November, 1991.
HALEY & STOLEBARGER

LL

Jepfrffy W. /Appel
Blaine J. Benard
Attorneys for Snyderville
Basin Sewer Improvement Dist,
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SUMMIT

) Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District

)
:ss.
)
AFFIDAVIT OF REX AUSBURN

COMES NOW Rex Ausburn, and being first duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1.
I am the General Manager of the Snyderville Basin Sewer
Improvement District (SBSID).
2.
At my request the staff of SBSID reviewed the locations
for existing and proposed sanitary sewer service within the
District.
3.
After the creation of the SBSID in the late 1970's and
its expansion during the early 1980's, several miles of outfall
and trunk sewers were constructed at public expense within
rights-of-way of roads dedicated by public use.
4.
The acquisition of easements in non-dedicated rightsof-way at public expense for the development and expansion of
services in the District would have precluded some of the
construction being feasible. The result would have been a
decrease or delay in the number of residents receiving the very
service for which the District was created.
5.
Like many of the existing sewer mains, the majority of
future lines will likely be installed in road rights-of-way
dedicated to the public by use.
6.
Because of the rural area served by the SBSID, most
roads outside of new subdivisions are not officially dedicated to
Summit County but are roads that have existed for many years. We
anticipate extending sewer service throughout the Basin over the
next few years and will utilize the miles of existing roads which
have been dedicated to the public by use.
7.
The costs to the public associated with future sanitary
sewer construction within the SBSID will be greatly impacted by a
requirement to purchase rights-of-way for construction within
existing public roads. All additional costs required for rightof-way acquisition will be a direct increase in the cost to the
citizens of our District.
DATED this lA* ^ day of November, 1991.

1991

REX AUSBURN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this lH
day of November,
DARLENEZ WHITE
Notary Pub'.c
STME OF tJAxH
iRY PUBLIC V
litf-iSaoUi, nw^ rfWih fttfVsrr^Rhonfe 801-649-7993 • Salt
Lake City Phone 801-631-7222 • FAX 801-649-8040

Tab 2

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY O F o U m - m / i ~ )

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC W. DEHAAN
COMES NOW ERIC W. DEHAAN, and, being first duly sworn, deposes
and states as follows:
1. That he is currently employed as City Engineer for Park
City Municipal Corporation and has been so employed in excess of five
years.
2. That he is the custodian of all official maps and plats of
Park City and is familiar with the official surveys of Park City and the
locations of the City's streets and highways.
3.
That, among his duties as City Engineer, are the
coordination of, installation and repair of municipal and other utility
lines, pipes and wires within the City's streets and other public
rights-of-way.
4. That in the areas of Park City originally subdivided by
recordation of the Park City and Snyder's Addition surveys, many of the
historic and actually travelled public streets and rights-of-way are not
located within platted, dedicated streets and rights-of-way.
5. The City's longstanding policy has been and is still to
treat historically travelled streets and rights-of-way as dedicated to
the public and under the jurisdiction of Park City pursuant to long
periods of public use.
6. It has further been the longstanding practice of Park City
to operate and maintain such streets and rights-of-way and to utilize
them for the location of municipal and franchisee utility pipes, lines
and cables for the service and benefit of the general public and of the
abutting property owners in particular.
7. In my opinion, as a professional engineer, the cost of
relocating all the public utilities in Park City which lie beneath roads
located outside the platted public easements and the cost of obtaining,
at market prices, rights-of-way for such utilities would impose an
unreasonable economic burden on the City tavpayprg^ag^ utility

